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The class of simultaneous 2x2 pure-strategy ordinal games (which include well-
known games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Stag Hunt) have received 
considerable attention, including complete classification schemes by amongst others 
Rapoport & Guyer (1978) and Robinson & Goforth (2005). This paper focuses on a 
particularly pertinent subset of these games, described as the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ (C-
D) games, which are characterised by each player having a dominant preference for a 
particular strategy by the other player. These games are therefore relevant in a number 
of contexts, including arms race games and collective action problems. The C-D 
games may be efficiently classified by assigning each player one of six distinct types, 
a classification that cannot be naturally extended to the full class of 2x2 games. The 
six types and the resulting game forms are analysed, and the subclass of CD games 






The humble 2x2 game has been the subject of a great deal of study in the social 
sciences. They have been applied in particular to the phenomenon of an ‘arms race’ 
between two hostile powers, and more generally, they are used as a tool of analysis of 
conflictual situations.  Study of these games typically starts (and sometimes ends) 
with the notorious ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, although other game forms have also 
received attention. While obviously representing a monumental simplification of 
complex situations, they can be perhaps seen as a simple, but remarkably fruitful 
metaphor for understanding what is going on. 
 
A few attempts have been made to classify all of the possible 2x2 ordinal games, 
where only the preference ordering of each player between the four possible outcomes 
is considered. A Taxonomy of the 2x2 Games, by Rapoport & Guyer (1978) was an 
early example. More recently, David Robinson and David Goforth (2005) in The 
Topology of the 2x2 Games, go a step further by underpinning their classification of 
the 2x2 games with a topological structure, by defining two games as ‘adjacent’ if one 
can be obtained from the other by swapping the preference orderings of two adjacent 
outcomes for one player. 
 Many of the 2x2 games most frequently the subject of theoretical and experimental 
analysis – including the PD, Chicken and Stag Hunt – share the characteristic that the 
choice for each player is between a strategy that is beneficial to the other (Co-
operate), and one that is harmful. (Defect). This paper generalises this idea, focusing 
on the subset of the 2x2 ordinal games, which I shall call the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ (C-
D) games, where each player has a consistent preference as to which strategy the 
other player adopts. These games have a natural interpretation in a wide variety of 
economic and political situations, wherever agents are faced with a choice between 
actions which carry a clear positive or negative externality for other agents. Examples 
include arms races, where each player will, generally speaking, prefer their rival to 
choose a lower rather than a higher level of arms. More generally, they are highly 
relevant for the analysis of conflict, where they open the way to considerations of 
threats, promises, rewards, punishments, deterrence, credibility and so forth. (See e.g. 
Schelling, 1960). Other examples are situations of contribution to a collective 
endeavour, or solving a common problem, i.e. collective action problems, such as 
those considered in Todd Sandler’s (2004) recent Global Collective Action. 
 
The next section briefly reviews some of the literature relating to the classification of 
2x2 games, and specifically relating to the types of situations, such as arms races, that 
can be described by C-D games. Section 3 introduces the Co-operate-Defect (C-D) 
subset, and shows that they can be succinctly classified by assigning each player to 
one of six well-defined preference-ordering types. The nature of these types, and their 
possible relation to real-world conflict situations is discussed. 
 
One of the considerations developed in this analysis is the possibility that the nature 
of long-term interactions between two agents (e.g. countries) may change over time, 
whether as a result of changes in the priorities of the agents, the external constraints, 
or the underlying strategic situation. This could lead to a change in one or both 
players’ ‘type’, and thus in the relevant game-form. In some cases, a small change in 
preference ordering by one player can lead to a radical change in the resulting Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
This question of ‘nearness’ of game forms to one another corresponds very naturally 
to a topological structure for the 2x2 games described by Robinson & Goforth (2005), 
which defines two games as ‘adjacent’ if one is obtained from the other by swapping 
two adjacent preference orderings for one player. Section 4 describes Robinson & 
Goforth’s topology, and section 5 locates the C-D games within Robinson & 
Goforth’s structure, elucidating the topological linkages between them. It is also 
shown that the specification of 2x2 games by assigning separate player types 
described in section 3 breaks down when extended from the C-D subset to the full 
space of 2x2 games. Section 6 completes the analysis of the topology of the C-D 
games by demonstrating that the graph of this subset can be drawn on the surface of a 
4-holed torus, in comparison to the 37-holed torus that Robinson & Goforth 
demonstrate is required for the full set. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature survey 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) holds a central position in the study of Game Theory, 
and continues to exercise a fascination amongst students and practitioners of the 
social sciences, evolutionary biology, and beyond. It has been applied to a remarkably diverse range of situations, and has had whole books devoted to it, (E.g. Poundstone 
1992, Axelrod 1984). However, the PD is just one of many possible game forms that 
could plausibly represent such strategic interactions, and considerable analysis has 
been devoted both to the properties of other simple 2x2 games, and to their 
classification. 
 
Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict (Schelling, 1963) is one key early work 
that seeks to apply simple game theoretic models such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Chicken, Co-ordination games, and many others, to problems of strategic interactions 
between nations, groups and individuals. This work develops a number of key themes 
that form the basis of much subsequent analysis, such as threats, credibility, 
deterrence, and so forth. However it does not seek to give a complete classification of 
the 2x2 games. 
 
It is not hard to show that there are in fact 78 possible 2x2 games, up to re-labelling of 
strategies and players – with four outcomes there are 24 possible preference orderings 
for each player, giving an initial total of 576 possible combinations for the two 
players. This must be divided by four to allow for re-labelling of either player’s 
strategies, reducing the total to 144. If we then treat the players as interchangeable, 
this gives the figure of 78. This is shown in Rapoport & Guyer (1966), and these 
authors provide a more detailed strategic taxonomy in Rapoport & Guyer (1978). 
Here, they classify games according to whether they have 0, 1 or 2 Nash equilibria, 
and then further classify those with a single Nash equilibrium according to the 
‘stability’ of the equilibrium, based on whether the equilibrium is vulnerable to either 
threat or force by one or other player. A threat-vulnerable equilibrium is one where 
one player could potentially induce the other to change strategy by a threat of a (self-
punishing) change herself, while a force-vulnerable equilibrium is where a player 
could induce a change of strategy by actually changing her own strategy away from 
the equilibrium. This is not entirely satisfactory – for example, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is classified as having a ‘strongly stable’ equilibrium, even though it is well 
known that the inefficient NE can potentially be escaped from in the iterated game. 
The classification also seems to group together games with some quite significantly 
different strategic properties. 
 
Lichbach (1990) and Plous (1993) are amongst those who investigate different 
possible game forms in relation to military arms races – one of the traditional 
applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, especially with regard to the Cold War 
superpower confrontation. Plous (1993) suggests that the Cold War arms race was not 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma at all, but what he referred to as a ‘Perceptual Dilemma’ – that 
is, where the real game was one of ‘Stag Hunt’ (or Deterrence) – that is, where each 
player’s first choice is (Co-operate, Co-operate), with (Defect, Co-operate) the second 
choice. That is, each country had a strong desire not to fall behind in the arms race 
(Co-operate, Defect), but did not have a strong desire to dominate the other. In this 
game, there are two possible Nash equilibria, the efficient equilibrium of (C,C), and 
the inefficient equilibrium of (D,D). However, Plous suggests that each country 
perceived the other as having the preference ordering of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, that 
is, of seeking an absolute military advantage. Hence, the inefficient equilibrium 
results. Lichbach (1990) discusses four different preference orderings that could occur 
in an arms race situation, based on different utility functions for each country relating 
to their own and the other country’s level of arms. These different utility functions lead to four different games, of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken and Stag 
Hunt. 
 
Both of these papers, as well as Hamburger (1969)’s analysis of ‘separable games’, 
raise the question of analysing games in terms of the preference ordering of each 
player separately – that is, we have the Prisoner’s Dilemma ordering of (D,C), (C,C), 
(D,D), (C,C), the Stag Hunt ordering where the top two are swapped, the Chicken 
ordering where the bottom two are swapped, and so forth. This idea is the basis of the 
classification of the ‘Co-operate-Defect’ games in the next section. Plous’s 
‘perceptual dilemma’ also underlines the significance of a small change in one or 
other player’s preference ordering for the strategic outcome – or indeed, of a change 
in either player’s perception of the other’s preferences. This theme is also taken up in 
the next section, and also links this analysis to the topological framework developed 
by Robinson & Goforth (2005). 
 
3. The Co-operate-Defect games 
 
A number of familiar games are characterised by each player having a choice between 
“Co-operating” and “Defecting”, that is a choice between friendly and hostile 
behaviour. These include the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt.  We may 
characterise these games by the fact that each player has a clear (or dominant) 
preference for a particular strategy to be chosen by the other player. Thus, the strategy 
preferred by the other player can be described as ‘Co-operate’, and the alternative as 
‘Defect’. These games are naturally suited to the field of conflict analysis. In 
particular, in any ‘arms race’ situation between two more or less hostile powers, Co-
operate and Defect have a natural interpretation in terms of the choice between Low 
and High levels of armaments. It is interesting to consider what are the full possible 
range of games that can occur in this Co-operate-Defect framework. 
 
Not all games can meaningfully be characterised as having “Co-operate” and 
“Defect” strategies’; for example in a Co-ordination type game, each player gains or 
loses depending on the combination of strategies employed. 
 
Defining and classifying the C-D games 
 
I define a game as a Co-operate-Defect (C-D) game if for each player X, there exists a 
strategy of the other player, which we call ‘Co-operate’, such that for each strategy for 
player X, he prefers the other player to choose Co-operate. We call the other strategy 
for each player ‘Defect’. 
 
Hence the Row player for example prefers (C,C) to (C,D), and (D,C) to (D,D), and 
similarly for column. A game is a C-D game if there exists a labelling of the strategies 
for each player that satisfy these restrictions. We may say that Row has a dominant 
preference for Column to Co-operate, analogous to the concept of a dominant 
strategy.
1 
                                                 
1 It is interesting to compare this class of games with Hamburger (1969)’s class of ‘separable games’. 
These are games where the outcome of each combination of actions by the two players can be 
separated into the sums of the outcomes of the individual actions by each player. There are 12 of such 
games, corresponding to games between players of type 1,4,5 and 6 (Prisoner, Appeaser, Warrior, 
Pacifist). These are the games where each player has both a dominant strategy, and a dominant  
These restrictions leave 6 possible preference orderings, listed below, and since the 
labelling of the strategies is now significant, each combination of preference orderings 
for the two players gives a different game, giving a total of 36 possible games. If we 
treat the players as interchangeable, this number is reduced to 21. The preference 
orderings (from the point of view of the Row player) are: 
 
1) (D,C) (C,C) (D,D) (C,D) (as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
2) (D,C) (C,C) (C,D) (D,D) (as in Chicken) 
3) (C,C) (D,C) (D,D) (C,D) (as in Stag Hunt) 
4) (C,C) (D,C) (C,D) (D,D) 
5) (D,C) (D,D) (C,C) (C,D) 
6) (C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,D) 
 
Where the most-preferred combination is listed first. The mirror image orderings 
apply from the point of view of the Column player. The last two are perhaps slightly 
curious, with the second-best outcome involving the other player defecting, but they 
satisfy the C-D restrictions. 
 
Describing the preference orderings 
 
Each of these six orderings thus gives a well-defined player ‘type’, with its own 
particular strategic characteristics, and the interaction between these types describes 
the strategic character of each game. I shall now briefly describe each type, with 
particular reference to the context of an ‘arms race’ type situation, or more generally 
an international conflict situation. 
 
1) The “Prisoner” 
 
Preference ordering (D,C), (C,C), (D,D), (C,D) 
 
This is the classic preference ordering for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. They have a 
dominant strategy of Defecting. In the context of an arms race, this means that they 
will always consider the benefits of gaining military advantage, or avoiding military 
disadvantage, to outweigh the costs and risks. It has frequently been argued to be the 
preference ordering of the two superpowers during the Cold War, though as noted 
above this has been questioned. While a Prisoner has a dominant strategy of Defecting 
in a one-shot game, it is well known (e.g. Axelrod, 1984) that it is possible for co-
operation to emerge as a long-term strategy in the iterated game between two 
Prisoners. 
 
2) The “Chicken” 
 
Preference ordering  (D,C) (C,C) (C,D) (D,D) 
 
This is obtained from the Prisoner ordering by swapping the two least-preferred 
outcomes in the preference ordering. In an arms race context, the Chicken is keen to 
                                                                                                                                            
preference for the other player’s strategy. Thus each player’s action has a fixed effect on both 
themselves and their opponent. gain a military advantage if they can get it, but fears (or perhaps cannot sustain) 
outright confrontation (represented by (D,D)). In other words, they will back down if 
confronted, but take advantage if they can. It might be conjectured, for example, that 
the Cold War arms race ended when the Soviet Union’s preference ordering switched 
from that of a Prisoner to that of a Chicken – their economy was no longer able to 
sustain the enormous costs imposed by the arms race. 
 
3) The “Deterrer” 
 
Preference ordering (C,C) (D,C) (D,D) (C,D) 
 
This is the ordering for Stag Hunt, but I have used the term Deterrer to emphasise the 
arms race/conflict analysis context. This ordering is obtained from the Prisoner 
ordering by swapping the top two preferences. The Deterrer might be seen as desiring 
peace, and placing little value on gaining a military advantage, but as fearing being at 
a disadvantage. They will thus prefer arms control (C,C), but will seek to match the 
military spending of their rival. Thus, the Deterrer is the mirror image of the Chicken, 
who places greater value on gaining an advantage than on avoiding a disadvantage. 
As noted above, Plous (1993) suggested that the US and the Soviet Union actually 
held the Deterrer ordering for much of the Cold War.  
 
4) The “Appeaser” 
 
Preference ordering (C,C) (D,C) (C,D) (D,D) 
 
This ordering is obtained from Chicken by swapping the top two outcomes in the 
preference ordering, and from Deterrer by swapping the bottom two. The Appeaser 
desires co-operation and fears confrontation. However, given the choice, they would 
prefer military advantage to disadvantage. The Appeaser has a dominant strategy of 
Co-operating. 
 
5) The “Warrior” 
 
Preference ordering (D,C) (D,D) (C,C) (C,D) 
 
This is obtained from the Prisoner ordering by swapping the second and third 
preferences. The Warrior has an absolute preference for Defection (higher arms). 
Thus, unlike the Prisoner, they will necessarily follow a strategy of always Defect, 
even in the iterated game. An interpretation could be that they are sufficiently 
confident that they can win any arms race, and desire the power that goes with that 
more than they desire peace. One might consider, for example, that the USA under 
President George W. Bush exhibits the Warrior preference ordering; they would 
rather that potential rivals did not develop more advanced weaponry, but they appear 
to show little interest in arms control agreements, preferring to proceed with ballistic 
missile defence technology, new generations of nuclear weapons, etc., as well as 
massive increases in military spending; they appear to prefer the benefits of global 
hegemony to those of arms control. One might also apply the “Warrior” analysis to 
the United States’ strategy in the build-up to the Iraq war; they had essentially decided 
to attack come what may, hence any degree of “co-operation” by Iraq with the UN 
weapons inspectors was irrelevant.  
6) The “Pacifist” 
 
Preference ordering (C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,C) 
 
This is obtained from the Appeaser ordering by swapping the 2
nd and 3
rd preferences. 
The opposite of the Warrior, the Pacifist has an unconditional preference for Co-
operating. Other things being equal, they prefer Co-operation from the other player, 
but nothing could possibly convince them to Defect. 
 
While it might be imagined that a Pacifist preference ordering would most likely 
come from moral conviction, it could equally arise in an ‘arms race’ (or non-arms 
race) scenario where a country believed itself too small for military defence to have 
any efficacy in providing security against neighbours. Thus, Costa Rica decided in 
1948 to abolish its armed forces. Costa Rica has had disputes with neighbours from 
time to time, including Nicaragua, but the armaments decisions of any such 
neighbours are irrelevant, as Costa Rica sees little value in possessing the tiny military 
force it could afford regardless. 
 
Other interpretations of the player types 
 
The analysis of conflict situations is not the only application of the C-D game 
framework. We may also see the player types in terms of their position in a collective 
action problem. Let us suppose that two or more ‘players’ (countries, groups, 
individuals) must decide whether to contribute some effort to achieving a mutually 
desirable goal. Each player will gain a non-excludable benefit B(n), depending on the 
number of players n who contribute to the effort, where B(n) is increasing in n and 
B(0)=0. (Let us suppose for simplicity that there are only two players), but will incur 
some private cost C if they participate. (This analysis bears some relation to an 
approach taken by Sandler (2004).) The six player types occur in the following 
circumstances: 
 
Warrior: C > B(2) – i.e. the private cost is not even worth the benefits of mutual co-
operation compared to mutual defection. 
 
Prisoner: B(2) > C > B(k)-B(k-1)  – the private cost is more than the immediate gain 
from the player herself co-operating, but the benefits of mutual co-operation outweigh 
the private costs -  i.e. the classic collective action problem. 
 
Deterrer: B(2) – B(1) > C > B(1) – this implies some non-linearity in the benefits 
function, so that the gains from collective action are greater than those from 
individual action – perhaps there is some ‘threshold’ level below which action will 
have limited efficacy. Another possibility is if the Deterrer is motivated by a sense of 
fairness, so that they would incur a subjective cost in being the only one to contribute. 
 
Chicken: B(1) > C > B(2)-B(1) – the opposite of the deterrer; perhaps there is some 
major gain from something being done, but diminishing marginal returns to effort 
thereafter. 
 Appeaser: B(k)-B(k-1) > C > 0 – always worth taking action, but if there is only going 
to be one person doing it, you’d still rather the other person bears the cost. 
 
Pacifist: C<0 – there are actually private benefits to taking action. 
 
Differences between player types in a particular situation could most obviously occur 
through differences in the private costs to each player of taking action. However they 




Interactions between the types 
 
The symmetric games, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken and Stag Hunt (Deterrence) have 
been fairly thoroughly analysed by other writers (e.g. Schelling, 1963, Lichbach, 
1990, Axelrod, 1984, etc.) In the PD, most attention focuses on the iterated game, on 
which there is a vast literature, perhaps most famously Axelrod (1984), which argues 
for the effectiveness of the ‘Tit-for-Tat’ strategy. The game of Chicken has received 
less attention, but there have been some interesting experimental studies, e.g. 
Possajennikov (2002), Rapoport & Chammah (1966). Less attention has been given to 
asymmetric games, although Robinson & Goforth (2005) for example discuss the 
‘Alibi’ games. But since there is no particular reason to suppose that both actors in a 
given situation face identical priorities and constraints, the asymmetric games deserve 
as much attention. 
 
Games involving Warriors and/or Pacifists are mostly uninteresting from a game 
theoretic point of view. Warriors will always Defect, and Pacifists will always Co-
operate, in both the one-shot and the repeated game, and whether or not enforceable 
agreements are possible.
2 The other player, whatever type they are, must make the 
best choice available to them knowing this. The significance of these types, perhaps 
especially the Warrior, is in realising when you are dealing with them, and that 
therefore approaches suited to, say, a PD situation, are no longer relevant. 
 
Prisoner vs Chicken 
 
In the one-shot game, the Prisoner has a dominant strategy of defecting. As the 
Chicken’s lowest preference is (D,D), this player will therefore be forced to co-
operate. The Nash Equilibrium is therefore (D,C) with the Prisoner listed first, giving 
a payoff of 4 to the Prisoner, but 2 to the Chicken. The Prisoner ‘wins’ this game.  
 
It is not a priori obvious what would be the outcome of the iterated game. On the one 
hand (assuming each player knows the others’ preference orderings), the Prisoner can 
easily adopt a strategy of always Defect, and the Chicken would appear to have little 
                                                 
2 This may not necessarily always be the case. For example a Pacifist playing a Chicken (or with more 
difficulty a Chicken) might still choose to play ‘against type’ in an iterated game, carrying out 
punishment defections in response to defections by the other player, in the hope of inducing co-
operation, to obtain the best possible payoff. However, this strategy is highly costly, as the punishment 
involves dropping down two places in the Pacifist’s own preference ordering, compared to what they 
would get if they accept the other player’s defection. It is also worth noticing in passing that Warrior vs 
Prisoner is slightly interesting in that it is the only C-D game that is also zero-sum. choice but to Co-operate. The ‘Tit-for-Tat’ strategy for the iterated PD would appear 
not to be available to the Chicken, as they lack a ‘credible threat’. On the other hand, 
it might be possible that if a Chicken were to resolutely stick to a tit-for-tat strategy, 
in spite of the short-term cost, they could induce the Prisoner to compromise on long-
term mutual co-operation. Such a question can perhaps best be answered with 
experimentation, either with computer simulations or live subjects. It seems likely 
though that, in comparison with the PD, the Prisoner has an advantage over the 
Chicken.  
 
The Prisoner-Chicken game could be seen as a model of how an arms race or conflict 
situation ends. In an ongoing Prisoner’s Dilemma, if one side finds themselves unable 
to sustain a continuing arms race or conflict, so that (D,D) becomes their lowest 
preference (swapping the bottom two preferences), then this player turns into a 
Chicken, and thus backs down. This illustrates how a small change in one player’s 
priorities or constraints can fundamentally change the nature of the game. 
 
Prisoner vs Deterrer 
 
This is sometimes called the ‘Alibi’ game, the idea being that one of the ‘prisoners’ 
(the Deterrer) has a cast-iron alibi that will get them off the lesser charge that they’d 
face if both prisoners remain silent. 
 
In this case, the change in preference ordering of one player does not change the Nash 
Equilibrium of (D,D), since the Prisoner still has a dominant strategy of Defecting. 
The interesting differences might come about in the repeated game. On the one hand, 
the Prisoner need have less fear of cheating by the Deterrer, since (C,C) is the latter’s 
preferred option, so one might expect it to be easier to establish long-term patterns of 
co-operation. On the other hand, the Deterrer has more to lose from a break-down of 
co-operation, so the Prisoner might do well to attempt occasional Defections (as 
opposed to a simple Tit for Tat strategy), as the Deterrer has more incentive to be 
forgiving and attempt to restore a Co-operative pattern. Tit for Tat is clearly available 
to the Deterrer as a meta-strategy however, since their threat of Defection is credible. 
 
Chicken vs Deterrer 
 
This game is unique amongst the C-D games in that it doesn’t have a Nash 
Equilibrium. It is therefore extremely difficult to predict what outcome will result in 
either the one-shot or the iterated game. In the latter it is possible that, somewhat 
paradoxically, a strategy of “always Defect” could be quite successful for the 
Deterrer, as this would compel the Chicken to Co-operate, while a strategy of “always 
Co-operate” could work well for the Chicken. The problem is that neither strategy is 
credible, in that each player has an incentive to “cheat”. It is also possible that a tit-
for-tat strategy could work for either player, although if this did achieve mutual co-
operation, the Deterrer would have some reason to distrust the Chicken, who would 
have a continuing temptation to cheat. 
 
Games involving the Appeaser 
 
If an Appeaser plays either another Appeaser or a Deterrer, the unique Nash 
Equilibrium is (C,C), the most preferred outcome for each player. It is hard to see why either player would ever deviate from this. In Prisoner vs. Appeaser, each player will 
surely follow their dominant strategy of Defecting and Co-operating respectively 
(Prisoner “wins”), and it is hard to see what the Appeaser might have to offer or 
threaten the Prisoner in a repeated game. (Though as with Prisoner vs. Chicken, it is 
just possible that the Appeaser could learn to ‘play against type’ and play tit-for-tat to 
try to induce co-operation in the Prisoner.) 
 
Chicken vs. Appeaser is slightly more interesting. The Appeaser’s dominant strategy 
is to Co-operate, and therefore the Chicken will defect, giving them their most 
preferred option as the Nash Equilibrium. The question is whether the Appeaser has 
any way out of this in the iterated game; the problem is they do not have a credible 
threat of Defection as a punishment strategy (at least myopically), but on the other 
hand if such a player does go against type and adopt, say, a ‘tit for tat’ strategy (or 
even an always defect strategy), then although they would be harming themselves, 
they would also be harming the Chicken, and so might be able to induce a change in 
behaviour. Thus the Appeaser has some incentive to attempt to, as it were, ‘cut off 
their nose to spite their face’. 
 
Discussion, and ideas for experimentation 
 
The question of what would happen in repeated versions of each of these games is 
interesting, and could be a fruitful subject for both theoretical modelling and 
experimentation. What is interesting is that in most of these games, there is at least the 
potential for ‘tit for tat’ strategies to be effective, even by a weaker player – that is, 
one whose best (myopic) response to Defect is to Co-operate. The question is whether 
such a long-term strategy, which involves potentially accepting considerable short-
term pain, can be sustained in the face of an equally determined Prisoner or Chicken, 
for example. (Punishment strategies are of course totally ineffective against a 
Warrior). For example, can an Appeaser go against their type and, as it were, acquire 
a backbone, in the hope of inducing long-term co-operation? 
 
This suggests an experimental setting where the participants are assigned different 
types (say, amongst the four middle types of Prisoner, Chicken, Deterrer and 
Appeaser), and matched against each other in iterated games. A variation on this 
treatment would be to make each player’s type a matter of private knowledge, so that 
a player might have an incentive to try to ‘mask’ their type to induce desirable 
behaviour in the other player; each player, meanwhile, would have to try to deduce 
their opponent’s type from their behaviour. I advance the tentative hypothesis that (in 
infinite duration games with sufficiently high discount factors) tit-for-tat may be a 
generally effective and hard-to-beat strategy for this scenario, for all player types. 
The attractiveness of this strategy comes from the nature of the C-D games: for all 
player types, Co-operate represents a ‘reward’ and  Defect a ‘punishment’, so that tit-
for-tat neatly encapsulates the notion of reciprocity, rewarding good behaviour and 
punishing bad. 
 
4. Robinson & Goforth’s Classification and Topology 
 
The above classification of the C-D games deals with 21 of the 78 2x2 games. It 
provides a compact classification, and also illustrates the interconnections between 
the games; each player type can be obtained from other player types by swapping two adjacent preferences. Such a swap in a player’s preference ordering could easily be 
seen as resulting from a marginal change in their priorities, constraints, or perceptions 
of the strategic situation. Thus, the analysis of the relationship between games formed 
from ‘nearby’ preference orderings is potentially of considerable strategic 
significance. 
 
This concept of ‘nearness’ or adjacency of games forms the basis of Robinson & 
Goforth’s (2005) classification, indexing and topology of the 2x2 games. In The 
Topology of the 2x2 Games, the authors produce a ‘periodic table’ of the 2x2 games 
that underlines the linkages between the games, consistent with a natural topological 
structure. This section briefly describes this classification and topological structure, 
and the next section will locate the C-D games within that structure. 
 
Indexing the games 
 
As discussed above, various classifications of the 2x2 games have been produced, 
including Rapoport & Guyer (1978), who classify the 78 distinct games (up to re-
labelling of strategies and players) according to their strategic properties. Robinson & 
Goforth take a rather different approach, indexing the games according to their 
topological relationship, based on nearness of preference orderings. In contrast to 
Rapoport & Guyer, they base their classification on the 144 distinct games that result 
if we do not treat the players as interchangeable; this is to fit in with the topological 
structure they impose on the games. 
 
Robinson & Goforth index each 2x2 ordinal game using three index numbers, as 
follows. Consider first the pay-off matrix representation. Suppose first that we fix, 
without loss of generality, Row’s first preference (payoff 4) to a particular position in 
the matrix. There are then first of all four possibilities for where Column’s first 
preference occurs: (1) in the diagonally opposite corner, (2) in the same row (3) in the 
same position or (4) in the same column. These four possibilities give the first of the 
three index numbers, from 1 to 4. This divides the space of games into four ‘layers’ of 
36 games each. 
 
The second and third index numbers reflect the orientation of the other three 
preferences of the Row and Column players respectively. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
given index number (1,1,1) (the first number being 1 as in this game the players’ top 
preferences are diagonally opposite). The other row indices are generated by 
alternately swapping the bottom two preference orderings, and the second and third 
preference orderings, for the Row player, leaving the first preference fixed, while the 
column indices are generated by doing the same thing for the Column player. This 
cycles through all 6 possible preference orderings for each player, giving all the 
games with index (1,Y,Z). The other (X,1,1) games are obtained by swapping the 
rows and/or columns of the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix as appropriate, and the 
other games on each layer generated in the same manner as on layer 1. The full set of 
144 games, arranged in their four layers, is shown in Appendix 1, taken from 
Robinson & Goforth (2005). 
 
Representing the games 
 Robinson & Goforth employ a convenient graphical representation of the 2x2 games 
that gives each distinct game a unique representation. First of all the four outcomes 
are represented as points on a 4x4 discrete grid of dots, with Row’s payoff measured 
along the horizontal axis and Column’s along the vertical, with (1,1) rather than (0,0) 
at the origin. For example, figure 1 above shows the outcomes for the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. We have the points (3,3) and (2,2) if both players Co-operate or both 
Defect respectively, (4,1) for (C,D), and (1,4) for (D,C): 
 
The players’ strategies are shown as follows: we join pairs of points that represent the 
same strategy choice by Row with dotted lines, and pairs of points that represent the 
same strategy choice by column with solid lines (See figure 2). Thus, (C,C) is 
connected to (C,D) with a dotted line, and (D,D) to (D,C), while the pairs 
((C,C),(D,C)) and ((C,D),(D,D)) are joined with solid lines. Finally, the Nash 
equilibria, if any, are marked. (I have marked it with a red dot below). 
 
As well as providing a handy visual form for a game, this representation gives a 
unique 1-1 correspondence between distinct 2x2 ordinal games and their graphs; 
whereas, with the traditional pay-off matrix representation, each game has four 
possible representations, depending on the order of the rows and columns. 
 
The topological structure 
 
The games are given a topological structure by defining two games as being adjacent 
if one is obtained from the other by swapping the preference ordering of two adjacent 
outcomes for one of the two players. Thus the games are made the vertices of a graph, 


















Figure 2 – order graph 
for Prisoner’s Dilemma neighbours. We call the operation of swapping the bottom two preferences for player 
X by X12, the middle two by X23, and the top two, X34. (Where X = R for the Row 
player, C for the Column player). 
 
Robinson & Goforth use this system to explore the properties of the graph. Each layer 
is generated from the game (X,1,1) by the operations R12, R23, C12 and C23, that is, 
those operations that leave the top preference for each player unchanged. Within each 
layer, each row or column of 6 is connected cyclically, since the sequence of 
operations R12, R23, R12, R23, R12, R23 lead back to the identity operation, and the same 
of course for column. The resulting graph structure is therefore topologically a torus. 
(See figure 3). 
 
The arrows at the left-hand edge of each row indicate that the leftmost square of the 
row is connected to the rightmost (via a C23 operation), while the top and the bottom 
of each column are connected via a R23 operation. 
 
Each Layer is divided into two-by-two “tiles” of games, connected using only the 
operations R12 and C12. The operations R34 and C34 connect the layers together in a 
series of “Pipes” and “Hotspots”; a Pipe is where four tiles, one on each layer, are 
circularly connected to each other using the R34 and C34 operations. Each Pipe is also 
topologically a torus: four circles of four, connected in a circle. A Hotspot is where 
two tiles on opposite Layers are doubly connected to each other. These occur in 
matching pairs. When all the Pipes and Hotspots are added to the four Layers, the 
result is a 37-holed torus that is required to draw the full graph of 144 games. 
 
For more details of Robinson & Goforth’s topology and analysis, consult the 
aforementioned book. 
 
5. The C-D games within the Robinson & Goforth topology 
 
The C-D games find a natural place within the graph structure and the indexing 
system used by Robinson & Goforth. First of all, it is worth considering the graph 
structure of the six individual player types. Figure 4 shows the connections between 
the types, with the operations involved in moving between them. Here Xij represents 
C23  C12  C12  C23  C12 
Figure 3 swapping the i’th and j’th payoff for player X. Note that the graph edges are 
undirected, as a simple swap operation is its own inverse. 
 
The full graph of the 36 C-D games (with players treated as non-interchangeable) 
involves meshing together two copies of this structure. This will be looked at more 
closely in the following section. 
 
What happens outside of these types, for example if you apply the operation X23 to a 
Chicken or a Deterrer, or an X12 or X34 to a Warrior or Pacifist? Does this lead to a 
well-defined player ‘type’? These moves take us outside the realm of C-D games, as 
the resulting preference ordering will have no dominant preference for the other 
player to choose a particular strategy. We shall see what this means for analysis of 
player types later. 
 
The position of the C-D games on the Robinson-Goforth Periodic Table 
 
Figure 5 shows the place of the C-D games on the Robinson-Goforth grid. The C-D 
games are shaded grey. As can be seen, the six player types occupy specific rows and 
columns of the grid. At first sight they may appear to occupy rather disconnected 
regions of the graph; however the toroidal nature of the layers means the C-D games 
are in fact connected, forming a 3x3 block on each layer. The ‘aggressive’ player 
types, whose first preference is (D,C) occur on the bottom and left-hand layers for 
Row and Column respectively, while the ‘peaceful’ types (whose first preference is 









Chicken  Deterrer 
Appeaser 
Pacifist 
Figure 4  
While the full topological structure of the C-D games is quite complicated, a central 
subset of them actually form a very simple subset, that plays an important role in the 
Robinson-Goforth topology. That is, the 16 games involving only the Prisoner, 
Chicken, Appeaser and Deterrer types, that form the 2x2 blocks at the bottom left of 
each layer. These four types are the ones that share an absolute preference for the 
other player to Co-operate, i.e. the other player Co-operating gives the top two 
outcomes for this type. 
 
Each of these 2x2 blocks form a ‘tile’ in Robinson & Goforth’s terminology, that is a 
block of 4 games connected using the R12 and C12 operations. For example, the 
bottom-left tile in layer 1 is connected as shown in figure 6. 
 
The four tiles are connected cyclically to each other via the R34 and C34 operations to 
form a Pipe, one of six such toroidal subspaces that connect the four layers. For 
example, the operation R34 takes each game in the above figure into the corresponding 
position in the following figure, which forms the bottom-left tile in layer 2, as shown 
in figure 7. 
 
Column type 























































































 The C34 operation then turns the Column player from Prisoner/Chicken to 
Deterrer/Appeaser, R34 takes the Row player back to Prisoner/Chicken, and C34 cycles 
us back to where we started in layer 1. We thus have a circle of four circles of four, 
creating a torus. 
 
5a) Extending the player type classification 
 
The above grid shows each of the six player types occurring on a particular row or 
column of the grid, for the Row and Column players respectively. One might wonder 
if it is possible to extend this to a consistent definition of player types for the rest of 
the 2x2 games, by treating each row or column as a distinct type. In fact this is not the 
case, since once the C-D conditions are violated there is no longer a meaningful 
labelling of the strategies, and so the unique definition of a player type by preference 
ordering is lost. For example, suppose we start with the Pacifist preference ordering 
for Column: 
 
(C,C) (D,C) (C,D) (D,D) 
 



























Figure 7  
(C,C) (D,C) (D,D) (C,D) 
 
This could be seen as giving some sort of ‘inconsistent Pacifist ordering’, that is 
Column still has an absolute preference for “Co-operating”, but they no longer have a 
dominant preference for Row to Co-operate, as (C,D) is now the worst outcome for 
Column. We are outside of the space of C-D games. 
 
Now let us suppose that Row is a Warrior, that is, she has a preference ordering of 
(D,C) (D,D) (C,C) (C,D). In the original Warrior vs. Pacifist game, the outcome is 
(D,C), giving Row a payoff of 4, and Column a payoff of 3. This game occurs in the 
top right corner of layer 4 (the bottom right layer). 
 
If the C12 operation is performed, swapping Columns bottom two preferences, 
Column now becomes an ‘inconsistent Pacifist’, and sure enough we have shifted one 
to the left on the grid. (see figure 8.) 
 
Suppose however that, starting from our initial Warrior vs. Pacifist game, we instead 
apply the operation C34. The result, surprisingly enough, is that we now have the 






















































































1) Warrior vs. Pacifist 2) Warrior vs “inconsistent Pacifist” 3) “Pacifist vs 
inconsistent Pacifist” 4) Pacifist vs. Pacifist judo by Column has calmed the savage beast, and turned Row’s Warrior into a 
Pacifist! 
 
To demonstrate this rather surprising fact, consider figure 9, the order graph for 
Warrior vs. Pacifist: 
 
Recall, Row chooses between the dotted lines, with the left-most line representing Co-
operate in this case, and the right-most line Defect. Row clearly chooses Defect, as 
Row prefers the outcomes further to the right. Column chooses between the solid 
lines, the upper one representing Co-operate, the lower one Defect. Column, the 
Pacifist, Co-operates. 
 
If we apply the operation C12, swapping Column’s bottom two preferences – that is 
swapping the vertical position of the two lowest dots on the order graph, we get the 
Warrior vs. “inconsistent Pacifist” order graph as shown in figure 10. 
 
The outcome is the same; though now Row’s choice of the right-hand dotted line can 
no longer be so meaningfully described as ‘Defecting’, since it includes Column’s 
middle two preferences. 
 
If instead we swap Column’s top two payoffs, that is we perform the operation C34 on 
figure 9, however, we get the order graph shown in figure 11. 
 
It is not immediately clear where this game sits in the grid, though the fact that the 
Nash Equilibrium is now the preferred outcome for each player suggests that we are 
in the upper-right layer, and this is indeed the case. For if we now perform C12, which 
always moves us one to the left or to the right as appropriate (remembering that the 









Figure 10  
This is the graph for the Pacifist-Pacifist game. For Row, the rightmost dotted line is 
Co-operate (as it gives the higher payoff for Column for each of his choices), and the 
rightmost dotted line is Defect. Likewise, the upper solid line is Co-operate for 
Column, and the lower one is Defect. It is not hard to show that each player now has 
the Pacifist preference ordering. 
 
Hence the previous game is the one which is a C12 operation away from Pacifist-
Pacifist, namely the game marked 3) in the grid in figure 8 – which is the position for 
Pacifist vs. “Inconsistent Pacifist”. 
 
Hence, a change in preference ordering for Column, using the C34 operation, has also 
changed the Row player’s type. This rather negates the sense of viewing each game as 
being one between two well-defined player types; for this to be the case, a change in 
one player’s preference ordering should only change their own player type. The 
conclusion is that player types cease to be well-defined when we move outside the 
realm of the C-D games. 
 
6. The topological structure of the C-D games 
 
We have seen that the 16 games involving only the Prisoner, Deterrer, Chicken and 
Appeaser types form a torus (that is to say, their graph can be drawn on the surface of 
a torus.)  What about the full graph of all 36 C-D games? 
 
A crucial property of a graph is the number of ‘holes’ that is necessary to have in a 
surface to be able to draw the graph on it. A planar graph is one that can be drawn on 
a plane sheet of paper, or equivalently, the surface of a sphere. The more complicated 
a graph, the more holes it is necessary to put in the sphere to be able to draw the graph 








• Figure 11  
V + F – E, where V is the number of vertices, F the number of faces, and E the 
number of edges. A planar graph has an Euler number of 2. A graph that can be drawn 
on a 1-holed torus (but not a plane or a sphere) has an Euler number of 0. Each 
additional ‘hole’ that is required subtracts 2 from the Euler number. Robinson and 
Goforth show that the full graph of 144 2x2 ordinal games can be drawn on the 
surface of a 37-holed torus, that is, the graph has an Euler number of -72. 
 
I shall show that this graph can be drawn upon the surface of a 4-holed torus; or, 
equivalently, a sphere with four handles. 
 
First of all, we may draw the graph of the 20 remaining games involving either a 
Warrior and/or a Pacifist on a plane (or equivalently, the surface of a sphere). This is 
shown in figure 13. 
 
It remains to show how this graph is to be connected to the 16-game torus involving 
the four central types. Each of the four squares of four games in the corners needs to 
be connected to a corresponding square on the surface of the torus. For example, the 
top-left square needs to be connected to the square shown in figure 14 with each 
(W,X) connected to (Pr,X) via a R23 operation. It is not hard to show that the 4x4 
toroidal grid of games can be drawn so that each of the four squares that need to be 
connected to the Warrior-Pacifist structure appears as a square on a plane piece of 
surface, that is, not circling round the torus. 
 This would at first sight appear to add four connecting handles, and therefore four 
holes to the torus, for a total of five. However, the first connecting handle does not 
C,W  Pr,W 
D,W  A,W 
Pa,D 
Pa,Pr 
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W = Warrior 
Pr = Prisoner 
C = Chicken 
D = Deterrer 
A = Appeaser 
Pa = Pacifist 
Figure 13 











W,A actually add any additional holes. Alternatively, we may redraw the 20-game graph 
above so that the other three squares are inside the top-left square. We may then draw 
this inside the relevant square on the original torus, as in figure 15. 
 
The inner rectangle with the three squares inside it is topologically equivalent to the 
original 20-game graph, except that in each of the short lines connecting the inner 
squares there is an additional vertex in the middle.  
 
Now each of the three inner squares can be connected to its corresponding square on 
the torus via a handle (along which four edges can be drawn, connecting each corner 
of the inner square to its target on the torus), so that three additional handles must be 
added to the torus to draw the complete graph. The result is therefore a 4-holed torus. 
Counting the edges, faces and vertices of this graph confirms that the Euler number is 




The Co-operate-Defect games, where each player has a dominant preference for a 
particular strategy by the other, form a theoretically and practically interesting subset 
of the 2x2 games. They have a natural interpretation in the field of international 
conflict and arms rivalries (amongst others), and can be linked together in a natural 
and concise way using the topological approach of Robinson & Goforth. There are 36 
possible C-D games, generated by the combination of 6 possible preference-ordering 
types by the 2 players. These types can each be seen to be reflected in possible real-
world scenarios, and many of the possible games formed by the interaction of the 
types pose interesting problems worthy of theoretical and empirical study. As well as 
the familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken games, perhaps particularly 
interesting are the Prisoner vs Chicken, Prisoner vs Deterrer, Chicken vs Deterrer and 
Chicken vs. Appeaser games. 
 
When located within the Robinson & Goforth indexing system and topology for all 
the 2x2 games, the C-D games form a compact block, appearing in specific rows and 
columns of the indexing grid used by those authors. However, the ‘player type’ 
classification used for the C-D games cannot consistently be extended to the other 2x2 
games, as it breaks down once there is no longer a well-defined meaning to the labels 
‘Co-operate’ and ‘Defect’ on the two strategies. 
 
The C-D games, comprising one quarter of the total number of 2x2 games, require a 
topologically much simpler graph to display their inter-linkages, one that can be 
drawn on the surface of a 4-holed torus, as opposed to the 37-holed torus required for 
the full graph of 144 games. A central subset of the C-D games, those involving only 
the Prisoner, Chicken, Deterrer and Appeaser types, form a particularly simple 
structure, a 1-holed torus, forming one of the “Pipes” in Robinson & Goforth’s 
terminology that connect the four toroidal “layers” defined for their structure. 
 
A fruitful possibility for future research could be to investigate experimentally the 
interactions between the different player types (at least the Prisoner, Deterrer, 
Chicken and Appeaser types) in iterated games; at least two significantly different 
treatments suggest themselves, one with full information about other player’s types, 
the other with player type known only to each player themselves.  
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